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Investments
By F. W. Thornton

Some recent writers have pointed out misapprehensions as to
the relative position of bonds and stocks as investments. They
have done much to clear the public mind, although much remains
to be said. It is intended to show here something of the variation
among differing classes of common stocks, and for that purpose a
short review of the whole situation, covering bonds as well as
stocks, seems needed.
Perhaps accountants are about as well fitted as anyone to
point out popular gross accounting errors in matters of invest
ment. Should the question be asked: What are the safest forms
of long-term investment? the answer would almost surely be:
life insurance, good bonds and mortgages, savings bank deposits,
good preferred stocks, good common stocks—and about in that
order. Accountants are not a little responsible for this general
classification of investments. Figures for the last twenty years
show that the order should be reversed.
Consider first the position of the bonds. If a person in 1913
had bought a gilt-edged bond, say, U. S. Steel sinking fund 5%,
he would have received in interest $600, which, with return of the
capital, would amount to $1,600. How much better off is a man
with $1,600 in 1925 than he would have been with $1,000 in 1913?
What was the real income available to buy things to eat and wear?
Fortunately, there are available figures to show this. So-called
“index figures” showing the cost of all commodities and of the
cost of living as compared with 1913 are published by Harvard
university, Fisher, Bradstreet, bureau of labor statistics, and
others. All concur in a figure for 1925 indicating the costs as
compared with 1913 to be about 155 per cent. This means that
$1,550 would buy of general commodities as much as $1,000
would have bought in 1913. Our bondholder has received in
twelve years $50 of income in excess of that needed to preserve
the value in necessaries of his original $1,000.
Suppose the money had been put in the savings bank at 4%
interest. Compounding the interest his present deposit would be
almost exactly $1,600. Again the real return is $50 in twelve
years:
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Our investor might well have wrapped his talent in a napkin—
bought steel rails, washing soda, window glass, anything—and
stored it in his cellar till now; he would be about as well off.
In time of severe stress, such as Europe has been passing
through since 1918, the case is worse. An instance cited to me
was that of an Hungarian family with an income from industrial
bonds—I think it was 5,000 kronen—sufficient to enable them to
get enough to eat and wear and to maintain a certain gentility
albeit a little shabby. Since the war their coupons are sufficient
to buy a small sandwich once a year.
True, they would have lost had their investment been in the
stock of the company whose bonds they held; but not nearly so
severely, for the stock represented some assets which remain and
are not the sport of debased currency nor subject to the steady
loss of value that all currencies have suffered in all countries at
all times ever since the laborer got one penny, his full union rate
of hire for a day’s work in the vineyard. Who can point to a case
of increased purchasing power of a monetary unit over a period of
100 years? I have sought it in vain.
He who buys a bond or mortgage, life insurance, non-partici
pating preferred stock, or acquires in any way a future right
to a specified amount of money is gambling on the chance that a
money unit, gold or other, will retain its purchasing power—a
losing bet for a thousand years.
But, suppose our investor had put his money into good common
stock—to continue the parallel let it be U. S. Steel common,
although any good stock would do. First, his immediate return
would have increased from $5 to $7 a share annually; not enough,
truly, to compensate for the increased cost of living, but an in
crease. Next, his stock is still represented by assets (aside from
profits retained in the business) that would be worth as much,
measured in the world’s goods, as those that represented it in
1913. And, finally, it is probably represented by two additions,
one being the undistributed profits and the other the amount
represented by the loss in real value of the bonds and preferred
stock arising from the fact that they with their interest and
dividends are repayable in a less valuable monetary unit.
If a steel furnace costing $200,000 in 1913 were then bonded for
$100,000, the bondholders would own half of it and the stock
holders would own the other half. If it were now replaced, as
such furnaces often are, and were constructed no worse and no
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better than before its cost would be perhaps $400,000. Now our
bondholder owns one quarter of it, the stockholder three quarters.
It is true that common stocks fluctuate in price much more
than bonds, but it is equally true that over any long period the
net effect of all the fluctuations of common stocks is a rise in
money value more than equal to the rise in the index figure for
general commodities.
It is also true that common stocks sometimes become worth
less. The remedy is to spread an investment over many stocks.
Upon the whole the gain on those that do not fail is more
than enough to compensate for loss on those that do, provided
that the stocks are chosen with a moderate amount of judgment.
Bonds are not altogether free from losses. Whenever such
losses occur in the case of trustees’ investments there is no com
pensating gain on other bonds, such as has been spoken of in the
case of common stocks; the principal of the trust is irremediably
depleted, even on the dollar basis. At the present time we have
some bonds that either are or have been considered gilt-edged, to
which attention might be directed—What price Chicago, Mil
waukee & St. Paul 4%, Erie 4%, New York Railways 6%, Chi
cago & Northwestern 3½%?
A danger to which investors in common stocks are subject is the
temptation to sell when a profit appears, in short, to speculate.
It is pretty well resisted by the owners of large fortunes. Every
accountant knows that the really wealthy choose their common
stocks carefully and keep them long; that they are not affected by
the daily fluctuations in price but hold their stocks with a view to
development over many years. That is the difference between
investment and speculation.
Looking broadly at the investment situation as it affects trus
tees, the prescribed investments under the laws governing trusts
are such as to insure with all but absolute certainty the eventual
realization by the beneficiary of a sum not greater in dollars and
less in purchasing power than the sum originally deposited in the
trust.
Let it be admitted that the instances cited are extreme—they
are. War conditions have hurried forward the rising tide of
prices, and for a few years we may look for a period of relatively
slow loss of purchasing power of monetary units. None the less
these instances, while exaggerated, are highly characteristic of
the whole financial history.
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Not everyone is fooled. Our financiers know better than to
bury their money in bonds. They know that falling money
values favor the debtors of the nation and so they become the
debtors. At the same time the professional friends of the poor,
from Jack Cade to Bryan, with the childlike idea that the poor are
the debtor class, have urged the cheapening of the currency.
The relatively poor put their money in savings banks, which in
turn buy bonds issued by corporations; small investors buy bonds
themselves; they buy life insurance, their premiums being in
vested in bonds; and they do not borrow, partly because nobody
will lend them anything. So, when the value of the dollar
decreases, as it always does, they lose, and those who borrow
their savings win.
To induce the small investor to buy bonds, graphs are made
up to show the relative steadiness of the prices of bonds as com
pared with stocks, and the return on bonds if held to maturity is
given with great accuracy, always on the assumption that a dollar
is a dollar and forever worth the same. The decrease of dollar
value which has averaged five per cent a year for twelve years is
not thought worth mentioning.
We also have professors, with their Sprague’s tables and loga
rithmic formulae, who tell us to the hundredth of one per cent
what return a fifty-year bond bought at 101 15/16 will give us;
and what part of the interest must be set aside on a basis of
scientific amortization to maintain the principal unimpaired.
Will they tell us what that principal will buy when the bonds
mature? If one were measuring the cubic content of the pyra
mids these professors would come running up with half a brick
saying, “See, you have left this out,” with eyes unseeing that the
rule had shrunk by half and was shrinking.
They have measured the national wealth and income with their
lessening measure and after a time measured it again; and they
cry: “How great the growth, how rich we are,” and government,
willingly enough, taxes the increase.
Life insurance has been referred to, but it is only as an invest
ment that the remarks have been intended to apply. There are
those who have taken upon themselves such responsibilities that
it is imperative on them to make provision against possible early
death. For them the premiums they pay have two components:
one a portion paid for protection, the other a portion paid as an
investment. For the company there is but one component; the
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number of their policy-holders is so great as to establish a statis
tical average upon which they can rely. A man is 61; so far as
the company is concerned it may say with certainty that for their
purposes he has 13½ years to live; so that for an insurance of
$1,000 he must pay annually a sum that will amount in 13½
years, at some previously fixed rate of interest, to $1,000. Ex
amination of life-insurance rates with an annuity table will show
the rate of interest allowed. It is always less than bonds would
pay, as indeed it must be since the premiums are invested largely
in bonds and out of the interest must be taken commissions, oper
ating expenses, profits and those monumental buildings that
adorn our cities.
As a protection, then, life insurance is a necessity to some;
they pay for it. As an investment it is an absurdity, largely so
because life-insurance companies must invest their funds in
precisely those securities that are the poorest investment for
others. The excuse is, of course, a mythical safety attached, in
the minds of our lawmakers, to evidences of indebtedness as
compared with the part ownership of material things.
The matter is perhaps now more clear. If we buy bonds we
invest in futures of a commodity—money—that has been falling
in purchasing power since the memory of man runneth not back
to the contrary. If we buy common stocks we invest in actual
existing things that may be expected to rise in price—not in real
value—just as fast as the cost of living rises, with further gain, if
the stocks are preceded by preferred stock and bonds, of the
amount lost by them in the rise of prices.
Which is the conservative investment? Is it conservatism
to assume that some loss is necessary and choose the least of the
losses, while another course is open without loss but with gain?
Altogether one is reminded of Teufelsdröckh:
“Toward anything like a Statistics of Imposture, indeed, little as yet has
been done; with a strange indifference our Economists, nigh buried under
Tables for minor Branches of Industry, have altogether overlooked the
grand all-overtopping Hypocrisy branch; as if our whole arts of Puffery,
of Quackery, Priestcraft, Kingcraft, and the innumerable other crafts and
mysteries of that genus had not ranked in Productive Industry at all.”
*
*
*
*
*

So far common stocks have been spoken of as a class. There
are, however, different classes of common stocks in which form of
organization, legal and commission controls and character of
assets bring about in a period of rising prices results departing
widely from the general average.
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There is, first, a class including railways, gas and water com
panies, and some other public utilities for which a limited or
specific return is prescribed. This return may be computed
as a fixed percentage on cost, on present replacement value, or on
“actual investment.” If the percentage or other limit of income
prescribed is to be applied to the first cost of the properties, and
if in the future no increase is to be allowed, the common stocks
have the same losses as bonds when prices rise.
If present value is used as a basis, then for those who originally
invested in the stock a proper allowance is made for any deprecia
tion of the dollar in the past but with no hope for the future. If
future rates are to be based upon values to be fixed from time to
time the stock is in the class of investments protected against
fluctuation in value of the money unit.
It might be said that public utilities have earned profits far in
excess of those necessary to pay a reasonable return and to keep
pace with the falling value of money. Some have done so; some
have barely paid expenses; some have gone to the wall. The
policy of governments, federal, state or municipal, has fluctuated
in the past between wide extremes. The tendency today is
towards a more stabilized condition in which public authority
recognizes that it is not wise, even if it is practicable, by restric
tion to limit profits of utilities to inadequate returns; and the
utilities are recognizing that reasonableness on their part will
produce more satisfactory results than will excessive exactions
from the public. Exceptions are to be found—the transportation
situation in the city of New York being a striking one—but these
are relatively infrequent and usually attributable to some special
influence or condition. Variations from average conditions are
found when the assets of a company are either predominantly
capital or predominantly current. Where prices rise the benefit
of the apparent increase in value of fixed assets does not at once
appear. They remain on the books at original cost for many
years, and in the current profits appear only those gains arising
from current operations, plus an additional gain due to the use of
plant obtained at a lower price than would have to be paid for
replacement—the depreciation provision, for instance, being less.
On realization of the whole business the increased price of fixed
assets partly compensates for the decreased value of money, but
not wholly, because some part of the apparent gain has appeared
in current earnings. Indeed, over a period sufficiently long,
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earnings would absorb almost all the gain in money value of fixed
assets, since these must be replaced at current costs from time to
time. Few, indeed, of our enterprises have such a long history
as to produce such a condition.
Where the assets are principally current assets, however, there
is little accumulation of increased price to compensate for de
creased purchasing power of money. The current earnings are
inflated by the constant absorption of the price changes. For
example, a corporation had a capital in 1900 of $200,000; it has
been engaged in wholesale high-grade dress material merchandis
ing; all its “profits” have been paid out in dividends. At this
time its capital enables it to own a little less than half as much
merchandise as it could own in 1900. The other half has been
distributed as profits. All merchant companies, film companies,
amusement enterprises, proprietary-medicine manufacturers,
and other companies with little fixed plant pay out as dividends,
or at least show as profits, part of the purchasing power of the
original capital, and in that respect their common stocks approach
the status of bonds.
Companies of this kind should show current earnings on a scale
materially higher than those of enterprises with large fixed assets,
and the stockholder should, in his own mind, classify part of the
dividend and accumulated surplus, if any, as representing depre
ciation of the money unit, rather than an increase in the real
wealth of the businesses.
There are companies with much capital in fixed assets, with no
capital liability but common stock, and no bonds. These com
panies approach nearest to the condition where apparent earnings
are true earnings, and the loss of purchasing power of money is
compensated by the increasing price of the fixed assets. If such
fixed assets exactly equalled the common stock, the adjustment
would, at first, be perfect; but as the fixed assets were replaced
or their depreciation provided for on the basis of book value, not
current replacement costs, the equilibrium would be gradually
disturbed and there would be some inflation of current income
with a loss of real value of fixed investment.
Finally there are companies with large fixed assets, bonded
debt, preferred stock and common stock. As all the increment
of price arising from the falling dollar value goes to the com
mon stock these companies should in theory accumulate for
that stock not only the increment of price in respect of the
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fixed assets it represents, but also the increment in respect of
such assets purchased with proceeds of bonds and preferred stock.
How large may be the practical advantage depends on the com
petitive situation. In a trade which is close to the saturation
point and in which most of the competing plants were constructed
before the decline of the money unit, little practical gain can be
expected. The steel industry today, for instance, has no expecta
tion of earning a fair return on the replacement cost of the prop
erty employed in it.
On the other hand, public utilities that before the decline of the
money unit were enabled by law to earn a fair return on the
present replacement value of their property might reap a large
proportion of the theoretical gain. So too (assuming equal
efficiency) would an older plant competing for business with plants
newly constructed.
Perhaps the most interesting thing that appears on a compari
son of these classes of stock is that in no case can current earnings
fail to include some fictitious gain when prices rise. Such gain
is greatest when the assets are principally current assets,
liquidated within a year, and lowest where the assets are princi
pally fixed, in fact almost disappearing in such cases to reappear
on final realization of the fixed assets.
The factor of increased money prices as a compensation for
decreased purchasing power of money units would seem to apply
in theory to the several classes of investments about as shown
below, the greatest compensation to the first named:
Security
Common stock
Common stock
Common stock
Common stock

Preferred stock
Ditto
Bonds
Mortgages
Savings banks
Life insurance

Conditions
Much fixed assets, bonded debt, preferred stock
Ditto
none
none
Little fixed assets
Income limited by regulation, based on cost or a fixed
valuation of assets
Participating
Non-participating
None of these has any compensa
tion for falling dollar value

It may be an excess of caution to point out that the considera
tions herein advanced do not form and are not intended to form
a complete basis for an investment policy. It is believed, how
ever, that they are entitled to greater weight than has been
commonly accorded them in the past.
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